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ABSTRACT
Article 22(1) of 1995 Constitution of Uganda protects the right to life and
provides that it can only be taken away in the ‘execution of a sentence passed
in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal
offence under the laws of Uganda and the conviction and sentence have been
confirmed by the highest appellate court.’  The death penalty is imposed for
some crimes such as murder, treason and terrorism.  During the constitution
making process between 1989 and 1994 and when the constitution was being
amended in 2005, there were arguments that the death penalty should be
abolished and replaced with life imprisonment which means imprisonment
until death.  These attempts were unsuccessful.  The constitutionality of the
death penalty was unsuccessfully challenged in both the Constitutional Court
and the Supreme Court.  However, both courts appear to hold the view that
if the death penalty is to be abolished, it should be substituted with life
imprisonment.  This article highlights the attempts and the arguments that
have been made to abolish the death penalty in Uganda.  The author argues,
inter alia, that should the death penalty be abolished and substituted with life
imprisonment, offenders sentenced to life imprisonment should not be
detained until death as life imprisonment without the possibility of release has
been found to be cruel and inhuman in some African countries such as South
Africa and Namibia.  Because the death penalty is no longer mandatory in
Uganda and it is likely to be replaced by life imprisonment, the author
discusses the objectives of punishment that courts in Uganda have always
emphasized in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment. 
I.  INTRODUCTION
Article 22(1) of 1995 Constitution of Uganda protects the right to life and provides that
it can only be taken away in the ‘execution of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court
of competent jurisdiction in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and
the conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate court.’  The
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1.  See, Towards Abolition of the Death Penalty in Uganda (a publication of the Civil Society
Coalition on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Uganda) (2008), at 1 – 37. [CHECK REFERENCE]
death penalty is imposed for some crimes such as murder, treason and terrorism.
During the constitution making process between 1989 and 1994 and when the
constitution was being amended in 2005, there were arguments that the death penalty
should be abolished and replaced with life imprisonment which means imprisonment
until death.  These attempts were unsuccessful.  The constitutionality of the death
penalty was unsuccessfully challenged in both the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court.  However, both courts appear to hold the view that if the death penalty
is to be abolished, it should be substituted with life imprisonment.  This article
highlights the attempts and the arguments that have been made to abolish the death
penalty in Uganda.  The author argues, inter alia, that should the death penalty be
abolished and substituted with life imprisonment, offenders sentenced to life
imprisonment should not be detained until death as life imprisonment without the
possibility of release has been found to be cruel and inhuman in some African countries
such as South Africa and Namibia.  
Because the death penalty is no longer mandatory in Uganda, there is a
possibility that many offenders found guilty of serious offences such as murder and
armed robbery will be sentenced to life imprisonment where courts find mitigating
circumstances.  This means that apart from the existence of mitigating factors, courts
will also invoke the objectives of punishment that the sentence of life imprisonment is
likely or intended to achieve.  It is against that background that the author highlights
the objectives of punishment that courts in the past have emphasized in sentencing
offenders to life imprisonment and argues that it is not unlikely that courts will
continue emphasizing these objectives in the aftermath of the abolition of the
mandatory death sentence.  What follows is the discussion of the legislative and
constitutional efforts taken to replace the death penalty with life imprisonment since
1992.  A detailed account of the history of the death penalty in Uganda has been given
somewhere else1 and is not repeated here.  The discussion starts with the work of the
Uganda Constitutional Commission.
II.  THE UGANDA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
The Uganda Constitutional Commission (the Odoki Commission) was established by
the Uganda Constitution Commission Statute of 1988 to seek the views of Ugandans
on which rights should be included in the new constitution.  The Odoki Commission
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18) Mr. Medi Kaggwa (Member); 19) Lt. Col. Serwanga Lwanga (Member); 20) Hon. Jotham Tumwesigye
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OF THE 1995 CONSTITUTION OF UGANDA (2005), at 1-18.
3.  Id.  D. MUKHOLI, A COMPLETE GUIDE TO UGANDA’S FOURTH CONSTITUTION: HISTORY,
POLITICS AND THE LAW 29 (1995). 
consisted of 21 members, who were appointed by the President of Uganda.2  Its terms
of reference were:
  (a) To study and review the constitution with the view of making proposals for the
enactment of a national constitution that would:
(i) guarantee the national independence and territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Uganda;
(ii) establish a free and democratic system of government that will
guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of
Uganda;
(iii) create viable political institutions that will ensure maximum
consensus and orderly succession to government;
(iv) recognize and demarcate division of responsibility among the state
organs of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary and create
viable checks and balances between them;
(v) endeavour to develop a system of government that ensures
people’s participation in the governance of their country;
(vi) endeavour to develop a democratic, free and fair electoral system
that will ensure people’s representation in the legislature and at other
levels;
(vii) establish and uphold the principle of public accountability by the
holders of public offices and political posts; and 
(viii) guarantee the independence of the Judiciary.
  (b) Formulate and produce a draft constitution that will form the basis for the
country’s new national constitution.3
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8.  Id., at 75.
It is clear from the terms of reference that the Odoki Commission had the mandate to
ensure that it came up with a constitution that established a government that would
guarantee the rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda.  This is because previous
governments had committed gross human rights violations in blatant disregard of the
human rights that had been enshrined in the successive constitutions.4  The
Commission’s terms of reference did not specify which human rights it should
emphasize.  What it was required to do was to ensure that the draft Constitution
established ‘a free and democratic system of government that w[ould] guarantee the
fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Uganda.’  This meant that the
Commission had a wide mandate with regard to which human rights it would consult
the public and which submissions with regard to human rights should be included in
the draft Constitution and how those rights should be phrased for debate by the
Constituent Assembly.
III.  PARTICIPATION OF UGANDANS IN THE CONSTITUTION-
MAKING PROCESS
To understand how the 1995 Constitution would allow the right to life to be taken away
in some circumstances, it is useful to understand how Ugandans participated in the
Constitution-making process.  This would explain the role of public opinion in the
Constitution-making process.  The Odoki Commission introduced mechanisms to
ensure that all Ugandans participated in the constitution-making process.  The
Commission organized district and sub-county seminars in all the districts and sub-
counties countrywide to brief local, civic and opinion leaders about the Constitution-
making process and the important issues to be addressed.5  The aim of these initiatives
was to ‘enable the majority of Ugandans at the grassroots to actively participate in the
constitution-making process.’6  Seminars for institutions and special interest groups,
like women, were also organized.7  Odoki was of the view that the major objective of
seminars for institutions and special interest groups was ‘to stimulate discussion and
debate and the secondary objective was to collect views.’8  Publicity campaigns were
also launched ‘to stimulate public discussion of constitutional issues amongst
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14.  Constitutional Proposals by the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights
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individuals and groups throughout the country.’9  Thousands of memoranda on what
people thought should be included in the new Constitution were collected from all parts
of Uganda and from special interest groups.10  Several non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) also submitted their views.11  Some of the issues raised in these memoranda
were that the new constitution should include a comprehensive Bill of Rights and that
it should incorporate international human rights.12  According to Odoki, every major
group—religious, political, professional, cultural, social or economic—presented a
memorandum.13
A.  Death Penalty Provision In, Life Imprisonment Out
The Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights was one of the interest
groups that submitted proposals to the Odoki Commission.  It proposed that ‘[t]he right
to life should be protected.  No life should be taken or death sentence imposed in the
manner prescribed [sic] by law.’14  It is very unlikely that the authors of the proposal
sought the prohibition of the death penalty under all circumstances.  Arguably, what
the authors meant was that no life should be taken or death sentence imposed in a
manner ‘proscribed’ not ‘prescribed’ by law.  In other words, the authors contemplated
that the Constitution would incorporate safeguards that under no circumstances should
the death penalty be imposed in a manner contrary to the law.  Put differently,
guaranteeing that the new Constitution should provide for circumstances where the
death penalty could be imposed, but in accordance with the law.  Thus, in its report to
the Constituent Assembly, the Odoki Commission stated as follows:
We have seriously considered arguments of both sides, critically
analyzed the international attitude to capital punishment, the
praiseworthy campaign of Amnesty International for the abolition of
the death penalty and consideration of the fact that the death penalty
has been abolished in several countries, including a few African
countries.  We fully understand the need for a change of attitude to
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capital punishment.  We have, however, not found sufficient reasons
to justify going against the majority views expressed and analysed.15
It is upon that background that the Odoki Commission recommended that:
a) Capital punishment should be retained in the new Constitution; (b)
[c]apital punishment should be the maximum sentence for extremely
serious crimes, namely murder, treason, aggravated robbery, and
kidnaping with intent to murder; (c) it should be in the discretion of
the Courts of Law to decide whether a conviction on the above crimes
should deserve the maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment;
(d) the issue of maintaining the death penalty should be regularly
reviewed through national and public debates to discover whether the
views of the people on it have changed to abolition or not.16
The above two paragraphs raise important points.  The Odoki Commission weighed the
views of the majority of Ugandans who supported the death penalty against those of
international organizations such as Amnesty International, which wanted the death
penalty abolished.  The Commission ‘fully’ understood the ‘need for change of attitude
to capital punishment’ but its hands were tied because the majority of Ugandans
supported it and there were no sufficient justifications for its abolition.  However, the
Commission recommended that capital punishment should be the ‘maximum’ not
‘mandatory’ sentence for extremely serious offences and that courts should have the
discretion to determine whether a person convicted of such serious offences ‘should
deserve the maximum penalty of death or life imprisonment.’
It is argued that the Commission thought that whereas the court should be
given the discretion to impose the death penalty, in the event that it did not impose it
for ‘extremely serious crimes’, it had to impose life imprisonment.  Put differently, the
court had two options: either the death sentence or life imprisonment.  However, the
Commission recommended that the question of the death penalty should be reviewed
regularly to establish whether or not Ugandans still supported its retention.
During the Constituent Assembly debates, three views emerged with respect
to the way the death penalty should be treated in the new Constitution: ‘[o]ne which
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19.  Id., Submission by Dr. Magezi at 1875.
20.  Id.
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is the most extreme—to abolish it; the other one, to retain it generally on criminal
offences; and the third one which specifies the types of criminal offences.’17  Because
the Odoki Commission had recommended the retention of the death penalty in the new
Constitution, the motion by some delegates that the death penalty be abolished
prompted the Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly to state that ‘...these
Amendments depart from the text.  The one that departs furthest is one which seeks to
totally abolish the concept of the death sentence or capital punishment...’18  Some of
the Constituent Assembly delegates who opposed the death penalty argued that the
death penalty does not achieve one of the major objectives of punishment – reform (in
the sense that a person who has been executed cannot be reformed) and that the
execution of the death penalty is not a punishment of the offender but ‘instead it is a
punishment to the rest of the family, relatives and friends’ and that there is no
‘sufficient information to conclude that death [the] sentence necessarily can deters [sic]
people from committing ... crimes.’19
Delegates supporting the abolition of the death penalty advanced a variety of
reasons in support of their contention.  Some of reasons were: that (a) the ‘better
substitute’ for the death penalty was life imprisonment, on condition that ‘life
imprisonment not meaning 16 years that are presently prescribed in Law.  But actual
life imprisonment...20 and that ‘if life sentence means life sentence’ the offender will
not come out of prison and reoffend and that such an offender will be ‘utilized in
prison, he will be able first of all to reform and will probably render some service to
this country through hard labour in prison;’21 (b) that ‘capital punishment originated
from primitive society’, (c) the argument that the death penalty is deterrent ‘is false’,
(d) that the ‘death penalty is not only wicked and cruel as a punishment but it is
responsible for making human life as cheap as fish;’22 (e) the death penalty was the
same as revenge yet ‘revenge is better’ and that it could be used to eliminate political
opponents;23 and (f) the death penalty was ‘barbaric’ and that ‘it is not a deterrent’ but,
controversially, that ‘death penalty is more lenient than giving someone life in prison
... [because] if you left [the offender] in prison ... he can suffer more than just this
436                                   East African Journal of Peace & Human Rights                               [Vol. 17:2
24.  Id., Submission by S.K. Kiwanuka, at 1877.
25.  Id., Submission by Mr. K. Robinson, at 1875.  One delegate submitted that people from his
constituency were ‘opposed to the abolition of the death sentence vigorously so.  To them, they think and
they are sure this punishment is deterrent [sic].  It deters more people who would commit murders.  The
only thing is that it is not possible to measure exactly how many are deterred but it has an effect on the
community.  The second reason is that although the death sentence does not compensate the bereaved ones,
it creates or gives some mental satisfaction with [sic] the fact that he killed our person he is also dead
(Applause).  It also discourages people – bereaved ones from taking the Law into their own hands.  Thirdly
it will discourage mob justice.  If the community knows that the person who killed the other will eventually
get away, they will not arrest whoever is suspected.  They will go in for him and kill him.  They will not
take him to Court.  They appeal to Members to uphold a death sentence as par our Law books.’  See,
Submission by Mr. Kiwagama, at 1876.
26.  Id., Submission by Lt. Col. Sserwanga Lwanga, at 1877.
instant death.’24  One delegate gave three reasons for his support for the death penalty,
explaining why he was opposed to life imprisonment as a substitute for the death
penalty:
[T]he death sentence has been effective enough in reducing murder
cases.  Secondly ... we will be setting a dangerous precedent between
the bereaved family and the murderer’s family in such a way that the
bereaved family will be forced to appease them on their own.  Thus
reverting to the years where it used to be the only means of settling
such cases.  Thirdly ... from the economic point of view, this abolition
of the maximum sentence from death to life imprisonment will create
unnecessary ability to the Government in maintaining these murderers.
(Applause).  Even more or less it will increase cases of corruption
because given time these murderers will want to buy their way out of
prison.’25
As mentioned earlier, Uganda’s history has been characterized by gross human rights
violations especially by military regimes.  It is upon that background that one of the
military officers in the Constituent Assembly supported the retention of the death
penalty by arguing that it was a deterrent because it ‘had worked very well in the
Army’ and that the abolition of the death penalty would lead to ‘lawlessness’ because
‘a soldier will kill somebody in the village and will keep on rotating with his gun
everywhere eating some food ... in prison, we shall not even administer this Army.
(Applause).’26  One delegate who rejected life imprisonment as the substitute for the
death penalty argued that the death penalty is a deterrent, ‘it is a way of getting rid of
the bad element from society. (Applause)  Those Delegates who say that we give the
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man or woman life imprisonment if that man or woman is a bad element in society,
wherever he or she goes, he can commit murder.  He can commit murder in prison.’27
One delegate argued that he supported the retention of the death penalty and that
majority of the people in his constituency (30 of the 450 who discussed the issue)
supported the retention of the death sentence on the ground that ‘life sentence ... is only
to encourage people to go to Luzira [Uganda’s maximum security prison] and do
management by remote-control for their families ... and the nation spends a lot of
money on [them]...’28
Some delegates argued for the retention of the death penalty while others
argued for its abolition. It would have taken the Constituent Assembly longer to debate
this issue if each and everyone was allowed to take to the floor and make submissions.
The submissions for or against the death penalty also became repetitive, with delegates
either agreeing with what others had already said or emphasizing the points made
earlier.  It is against this background that one of the delegates suggested to the
Chairperson of the Constituent Assembly that since he (the Chairperson) had the names
of those who were for or against the death penalty, ‘people by indication would give
their views whether they support [the death penalty] or not without necessarily
spending ten or twenty minutes debating the obvious principles.’29  When the motion
was put to vote, 144 delegates supported the retention of the death penalty, 26
supported the abolition of the death penalty, and three abstained.30  When the
Constitution was adopted and promulgated, it provided under Article 22(1) that
No person shall be deprived of life intentionally except in execution
of a sentence passed in a fair trial by a court of competent jurisdiction
in respect of a criminal offence under the laws of Uganda and the
conviction and sentence have been confirmed by the highest appellate
court.
Most supporters of abolition of the death penalty argued that life imprisonment, which
meant that the offenders would spend the rest of their life in prison, would have been
a better substitute.  The supporters of the death penalty saw life imprisonment as not
sufficiently deterring.  They also argued that it would be expensive for the state to keep
a person in prison for life.  Although it is not a strong point to justify the retention of
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the death penalty, the financial consequences for a person who has been imprisoned for
life cannot be underestimated.  We are talking about people who would grow old in
prisons, who cannot do any prison labour because of old age, and who need constant
medical attention, which may not even be available in prisons.  One has to recall that
in many prisons in Uganda, prisoners are being detained under conditions that are
below internationally accepted standards.  This exposes them to many infectious
diseases and could explain why the Supreme Court recommended that ‘[t]he
government and all those who inspect prisons must ensure that the conditions under
which all prisoners are kept strictly conforms [sic] to the law and to international
standards.’31
IV.  ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE DEATH PENALTY PROVISION: THE
LIFE IMPRISONMENT ISSUE RE-EMERGES
In 2002 the government appointed the Constitutional Review Commission whose
mandate was to seek the views of Ugandans on whether or not several aspects of the
Constitution needed to be amended, and if so, what the amendments should be.32  The
Commission was required to elicit the public’s views on whether or not some
provisions of the Bill of Rights needed to be amended.  In its report, the Commission
stated that ‘the people are in agreement that the [human rights] provisions in the
Constitution are adequate.’33  In respect to the Bill of Rights, the Commission was
mandated also to consider particularly ‘whether the death penalty should be
abolished...’34  After reviewing the relevant international human rights instruments, the
Commission found that ‘[i]t is apparent ... that the death penalty is not outlawed by
2011]                         Death Penalty v. Life Imprisonment in Uganda, 1993 – 2009                             439
35.  Id., ¶ 13.4.
36.  Id., ¶ 13.5.  The reasons were: it is a just penalty for serious crimes such as murder, rape and
defilement of minors; it demonstrates society’s disapproval of serious crimes; without the death penalty,
serious crimes will be on the increase; the people of Uganda approve of the death penalty, if it is abolished,
the people will resort to mob justice; and that those who urge for the abolition of the death penalty are not
concerned about the rights of the victims.
37.  Id., ¶ 13.5.  These crimes include murder, kidnaping with intent to murder, defilement of
minors, and intentionally spreading AIDS.
38.  Id., at 13-173.
39.  Id., at 13-173.  The reasons were: the death penalty is a cruel and inhuman punishment; it
simply terminates the life of the condemned person and therefore serves no purpose; there is no credible
evidence that the existence of the death penalty deters people from committing crimes; God does not permit
killing; and that civilized societies are abolishing the death penalty.
international law.  However, a trend towards its abolition is evident.’35  The
Commission reported that ‘[t]he people responded widely on this issue.  The majority
who responded argued in favour of retaining the death penalty’ for several reasons.36
The Commission also added that ‘[a] substantial percentage of those who support the
penalty want it to be retained for only the most heinous crimes.’37
Some of the supporters of the death penalty also ‘expressed concern about the
long stay of convicts before execution, a burden to the tax payer, and recommended
expeditious executions.’38  Those opposed to the death penalty supported their position
with arguments ranging from human rights concerns to religious issues.39  Of interest
were the recommendations made by the Uganda Prisons Service, the institution charged
not only with the imprisonment of those sentenced to life imprisonment, but also with
the execution of the death sentence.  Like many other people who supported the
abolition of the death penalty, it recommended that the death penalty be substituted
with life imprisonment without reprieve.  The submission is worth reproducing:
As an alternative to the death penalty most of the people who want it
abolished have proposed life imprisonment without any reprieve.
Some have proposed that the convict be engaged in productive labour;
that some of the proceeds of that labour should compensate the victims
of the crime.  The Uganda Prisons Service made a submission ...
calling for the abolition of the [death] penalty.  They stated that the
execution of the death sentence is very traumatizing to the Prison staff.
“It affects the life of the officers carrying it out because of their
professional relationship to the inmates.  They recommended that the
death penalty should be replaced by life imprisonment; that life
imprisonment should imply “imprisonment until death.”  “In this way,
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the death of the offender can be achieved without hanging him.”40
This submission needs to be assessed in the light of the following two factors: One, the
Uganda Prisons Service has never dealt with offenders who are to be imprisoned for
the rest of their lives and therefore has never faced the challenge of dealing with
prisoners who know that even if they misbehaved in prison all the sentences imposed
on them will have no practical effect.  Two, the only reason why the Uganda Prisons
Service opposed the death penalty was because it traumatizes the officers who execute
it.  That explains why the Prison officers recommended to the Commission that ‘if
executions have to continue, this gruesome exercise be privatized and performed away
from prison.’41
The Commission finally recommended the retention of the death penalty
because the majority of Ugandans still supported it.  But recommended that the death
penalty be retained and remain a mandatory sentence for the crimes of murder,
aggravated robbery, kidnaping with intent to murder, and the defilement of minors
below fifteen years of age.42  The Commission also recommended that since
‘[e]xecuting the sentence of death by hanging with the rope until the convict dies is
painful[,] [that] [t]he sentence should be implemented by a method which ensures
instant death.’43
In its White Paper, the Government accepted the recommendations of the
Commission on the death penalty and noted that ‘article 22 of the Constitution that
relates to [the] protection of [the] right to life will not require any amendment.’44  In
its report on the Government White Paper, the Parliamentary Committee on Legal
Affairs also agreed with the government’s recommendations that the death penalty
should be retained and the mode of execution revised.45  This meant that the only way
that the death penalty could be challenged was through courts of law because the
proposed amendments had retained Article 22 intact.
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V.  CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court of Uganda handed down the long-awaited
judgment of the Susan Kigula case.46  It was a result of an appeal against the
Constitutional Court’s ruling, inter alia, that the death penalty was not
unconstitutional, but that the mandatory death sentence in the Penal Code Act for
murder was.47  Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, both the government and
death row inmates appealed to the Supreme Court with the government arguing, inter
alia, that the Constitutional Court erred in law when it found that mandatory death
penalty for murder was unconstitutional.48  
On the other hand, the death row inmates appealed against the Constitutional
Court’s ruling that the death penalty was not unconstitutional and therefore not a cruel,
inhuman and degrading form of punishment because it was provided for under the
Constitution.49  They also appealed against the Constitutional Court’s finding that
hanging, as a form of execution, was not a cruel and inhuman punishment within the
meaning of Article 24 of the Constitution, and therefore not unconstitutional.50
While the appeal against the Constitutional Court’s judgment was pending
before the Supreme Court,51 the sentencing of offenders who had been found guilty of
murder became not only a source of considerable uncertainty at the High Court level
but had also almost come to a standstill in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
With regard to the High Court, some judges held the view that the death penalty was
still a mandatory sentence for murder and sentenced offenders accordingly.52  Other
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53.  For example, in Uganda v. Bizimana (HC-00-CR-SC-0122 of 2005)[2006]UGHC 46 (16
January 2006) the accused was convicted of nine counts of murder  (him and others murdered tourists) and
the Court before sentencing him to 15 years’ imprisonment instead of death held that ‘[i]n Constitutional
Section [sic] No.6 of 2003 the Constitutional Court ruled and declared that Section 189 of the Penal Code
which prescribes a mandatory death sentence is inconsistent with Article 21, 22(1), 24, 28, and 44(a) and
44(b) of the Constitution.  The court ordered that in capital offences, the trial court must, before sentencing
the convict afford him/ her a hearing on mitigation of [the] sentence.’  In Okwang William v. Uganda
(Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 2002)[2007]UGCA 59 (21 May 2007) the appellant’s appeal against his
conviction for murder was confirmed by the Court of Appeal which then observed that ‘[t]he death
sentence was passed against the appellant on 8 May 2002.  This was before the Constitutional Court
pronounced itself on the mandatory death sentence... we have taken into account all the mitigating factors.
We have found no mitigating factors deserving reduction of the sentence.  We are of the considered view
that this was a brutal murder...  The ground on mitigation of the sentence that was imposed on the appellant
also fails.’  Of the 47 offenders who were serving life imprisonment in Uganda in July 2008, five had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death.  See, J.D. Mujuzi, Why the
Supreme Court of Uganda should Reject the Constitutional Court’s Understanding of Imprisonment for
Life, 8 AFR. HUM. RTS L. J. 163 (2008), at 167.
54.  For example, Absolom Omolo Owiny v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2003) [2008]
UGCA 2 (8 April 2008) the appellant’s appeal against his conviction for murder was dismissed and on the
issue of the sentence of death imposed on him, the Court of Appeal ‘regarding ground 4 of the
memorandum of appeal which concerns mitigation of sentence, we would say that we cannot enforce our
decision in … Susan Kigula and 416 Ors v. Attorney General because it is pending confirmation of the
Supreme Court, on appeal.’
55.  For example, in Enock v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 11 of 2004] [2007] UGSC 3 (30
May 2007) the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s conviction for murder but held that ‘because of
the decision of the Constitutional Court in Constitutional Court Petition No. 6 of 2006 (Susan Kigula &
417 Others v. Attorney General) from which an appeal is pending in this Court, we exercise our discretion
and postpone confirmation of sentence in this case under Article 22(1) of the Constitution, until
determination of the pending Constitutional Appeal in this Court’; in Susan Kigula Sserembe and Anor
v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 1of 2004)[2008] UGSC 15 (15 October 2008) the Supreme Court
dismissed the appellants’ appeal against their conviction for murder but held that ‘[t]he sentence of death
imposed upon the appellants is suspended pending the determination of Constitutional Appeal No.3 of
2006.’  See also, Bagatenda Peter v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 10 of 2006) [2007] UGSC 15 (16
October 2007); Sekandi Hasan v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2005) [2007] UGSC 12 (5 July
2007).
High Court (and also Court of Appeal) judges were of the view that the death sentence
was a discretionary sentence in cases of murder, and imposed lesser sentences where
there were mitigating circumstances.53  At the Court of Appeal54 and Supreme Court
levels, sentencing in several judgments where the appeals of offenders who had been
convicted of murder and sentenced to death had been dismissed and put on hold
because the judges were waiting for the Supreme Court’s ruling on the constitutionality
of the death penalty and the constitutionality of the mandatory death sentence for
murder.55
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56.  Susan Kigula case, supra note 15, at 63.
57.  L. Afedraru et al,  Uganda Supreme Court Upholds Death Sentence, DAILY MONITOR, 22
January 2009; Editorial, Positives from Ruling on the Death Penalty, DAILY MONITOR, 23 January 2009;
A. Mugisa et al, Death Sentence Judgment Puzzles Lawyers, NEW VISION, 22 January 2008; A. Mugisa
& H. Nsambu, Supreme Court Retains Death Penalty, NEW VISION, 21 January 2009; and J.D. Mujuzi,
Implications of the Death Penalty Ruling, DAILY MONITOR, 28 January 2009.
58.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7841749.stm>, (accessed 24 January 2009); and Uganda’s
Supreme Court Declares Death Penalty Right, GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, 22 January 2009.
59.  See, T. Butagira et al, Death Penalty Ruling Puzzles Prison Bosses, SATURDAY MONITOR,
24 January 2009 (reporting that: ‘The Supreme Court ruling that prisoners, who have stayed on death row
for more than three years, after exhausting all appeals, should not be executed but imprisoned for life has
confused prison officials.  Saturday Monitor has learnt that the officials are puzzled about how to handle
On 21 January 2009, the Supreme Court finally handed down its judgment and
held: first, that the death penalty is constitutional because it is sanctioned under the
Constitution and that the framers of the Constitution took into consideration Uganda’s
history of grave human rights violations before including Article 22(1) in the
Constitution, which provides that the right to life can be taken away as long as the
manner in which it is taken away is not ‘arbitrary;’ second, that the mandatory death
sentence is unconstitutional because it violates the offender’s right to a fair trial in the
sense that he or she cannot be heard in mitigation at the sentencing stage.
It also infringed the doctrine of separation of powers because it eliminated the
judge’s discretion in determining which sentence fitted both the offence and the
offender; thirdly, that hanging, as a form of execution, is not a cruel, inhuman and
degrading punishment within the meaning of Article 24 of the Constitution.  It was
therefore not unconstitutional and that there was no evidence that other methods of
execution, such as, lethal injection, were less painful than hanging; and third and most
importantly for our discussion, that when a prisoner sentenced to death spends three
years in detention after his appeal has been dismissed by the highest court and his
application for the President to exercise his prerogative of mercy and commute his
sentence has not been dealt with, to know whether he has been granted reprieve or
remission or would be executed , the death row phenomenon sets in.
The Court held that the death row phenomenon is a cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment and that executing a prisoner who has spent three years on death
row is cruel, inhuman and degrading.  The Court ordered that a prisoner who has been
on death row for three years and more his sentence should automatically be commuted
to ‘imprisonment for life without remission.’56  The Court’s ruling attracted
considerable media coverage both in Uganda57 and abroad.58  However, it also had the
effect of confusing prison authorities on how they should deal with prisoners who had
exhausted their appeals and had been on death row for more than three years.59  The
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condemned persons still in formal confinement.  Dr. Johnson Byabashaija, the [C]ommissioner [G]eneral
of Uganda Prisons, said the government needs to clarify if the …decision, a rising from a petition by some
417 death row inmates to have the court quash the death sentence, would apply retrospectively.  “We are
going to write to the Attorney General…for advice because the Supreme Court ruling has got implications
on all persons who have gone through all appeals [and stayed thereafter] on death row for more than three
years”).
60.  Susan Kigula case, supra note 15, at 43.
61.  Id., at 64.
62.  See, J.D. Mujuzi, Life Imprisonment in South Africa: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 22
S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUSTICE (2009), at 11-20.
Court should be applauded for declaring  mandatory death sentence unconstitutional.
At least this would save many people who would have been convicted of murder, but
with mitigating circumstances, from being sentenced to death.  In the words of the
Court:
Not all murders are committed in the same circumstances, and all
murderers are not necessarily of the same character.  One may be a
first offender, and the murder may have been committed in
circumstances that the accused person deeply regrets and is very
remorseful.  We see no reason why these factors should not be put
before the court before it passes the ultimate sentence.60
Consequently, the Court ordered that:
[f]or those respondents whose sentences arose from the mandatory
sentence provisions and are still pending before an appellate Court,
their cases shall be remitted to the High Court for them to be heard
only on mitigation of sentence, and the High Court may pass such
sentence as it deems fit under the law.61
The South African experience shows that it is not unlikely that several offenders who
were on death row could be re-sentenced to life imprisonment or lengthy prison terms
pursuant to the Court’s order after being heard in mitigation.62  However, in Uganda
some offenders could still be sentenced to death when the High Court deems it fit that
the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.  The Court
should also be applauded for holding that keeping death row inmates for longer than
three years in detention after they have exhausted their appeals which allowed the death
row phenomenon to set in was cruel, inhuman and degrading.  The Court ordered that:
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63.  Susan Kigula case, supra note 15, at 63.
64.  Id., at 57.
65.  See, Vision Reporter, Museveni Backs Court on Death Penalty, NEW VISION, 26 January
2009.
[f]or those respondents whose sentences were already confirmed by
the highest Court, their petitions for mercy under article 121 of the
Constitution must be processed and determined within three years
from the date of confirmation of the sentence.  Where after three years
no decision has been made by the Executive, the death sentence shall
be deemed commuted to imprisonment for life without remission.63
The Court held that it should not be misunderstood as calling upon the government to
execute expeditiously prisoners whose appeals and application for clemency have been
dismissed. However, in what appears to be a contradiction, it held that ‘a delay [in]
carrying out [a] sentence beyond three years from the date when the sentence of death
was confirmed by the highest court constitutes unreasonable delay.’64  Consequently,
the execution of a prisoner after the expiry of that period would be cruel and inhuman
and therefore unconstitutional. 
It is argued that there are three possible implications that could flow from the
above ruling.  One, when all prisoners who have been sentenced to death apply for
clemency, there is no requirement that the President must consider those applications
on a first-come-first-serve basis.  Therefore, there is a perceived danger that some
applications (for example of political prisoners, ritual murderers or people who have
committed the worst forms of murder) being fast-tracked and quickly declined so that
the prisoner is executed as soon as possible before the death row syndrome sets in.
This is not unlikely because in his reaction to the Supreme Court ruling, the President
of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, reportedly said that he was happy that the Court
had not abolished the death penalty and that ‘those who kill innocent Ugandans deserve
nothing less than death.’65  The second consequence is the most obvious one: if within
three years of the application the President’s decision on the application for clemency
is still pending, the death sentence is automatically commuted to life imprisonment
without remission.  The third consequence is that the President could commute many
death sentences to either lengthy prison terms or life imprisonment.
The Court could have gone too far in ordering that those prisoners whose
applications for clemency have not been attended to within three years should have
their death sentence deemed to have been commuted to imprisonment for life without
remission.  It should not have overlooked the fact that the prison authorities have the
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66.  Prisons Act, Act 17 of 2006.
67.  The Mauritius National Commission on Human Rights reported that ‘[t]he Security Audit
Committee commented on the fact that those convicted of drug offences are not entitled to any remission.
 Other prisoners are entitled as of right to one third of their sentence as remission.  Misconduct on their
part is sanctioned by a loss of remission.  There is an incentive for them to be of good conduct.  On the
other hand, as drug offenders are not entitled to remission, they have no incentive to be of good behaviour.
We endorse the view of the Security Audit Committee that a measure of remission would be of beneficial
to both offenders and the prisons administration.  It is hoped that the authorities will come forward with
appropriate measures.’  See, THE 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
OF MAURITIUS (February 2002), ¶¶ 76-77.
68.  Personal interview with 10 prisoners who are serving life imprisonment in the Luzira
Maximum Security prison, Kampala, Uganda on 14 January 2008.  (One of the prisoners interviewed was
to be released in the following month because he had served 16 years and 7 months).  The prison officers
also informed the author that it is true that prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment though could serve the
maximum of 20 years and that in practice if they behaved well their sentence could be remitted to 16 years,
8 months and 10 days.
discretion to grant remission to offenders for meritorious behaviour in prison.  This
discretion derives from sections 84 to 86 of the Prisons Act.66  Remission of a sentence
is always an incentive for good conduct in prison.  Evidence from other countries like
Mauritius shows that prisoners who are aware that they are not entitled to remission are
hard to manage and can be troublesome.67  However, unlike the Constitutional Court,
which held that if the death penalty is to be abolished life imprisonment should mean
that the prisoner would be imprisoned for the rest of his life, the Supreme Court held
that death sentences would be commuted to life imprisonment without remission.  
It is argued that there is a difference between life imprisonment where the
prisoner is imprisoned for the rest of his life on the one hand and life imprisonment
without remission.  In the latter case, a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment would
have to be imprisoned for 20 years because under the Uganda Prisons Act, life
imprisonment means a maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment.  However, in practice,
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment are released after serving 16 years, 8 months
and 10 days if they behaved well while in prison and earned credits.68  However, in the
former scenario, the prisoner would be imprisoned until death.
The Supreme Court’s ruling could also be interpreted to mean that an offender
whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment without remission
should remain in prison for the rest of his life.  This interpretation would be disputable
on at least two grounds: First, if the Supreme Court wanted to hold that life
imprisonment should mean life imprisonment where the prisoner would be imprisoned
for the rest of his life, it should have expressly stated so.  But it chose to rule that such
prisoners are not entitled to remission.  Second, as indicated above, after the Supreme
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69.  See, Butagira et al, supra note 59.
70.  See, C. Ariko, Five Death Row Inmates Pardoned, NEW VISION, 15 November 2009;  L.
Afedraru, Death Row Convicts Remission to Life Imprisonment is Legal, DAILY MONITOR, 5 December
2009.
71.  See generally, Mujuzi, supra note 62; J.D. Mujuzi, The Evolution of the Meaning(s) of Penal
Servitude for Life (Life Imprisonment) in Mauritius: The Human Rights and Jurisprudential Challenges
Confronted So Far and Those Ahead, 53 J. AFR. L. (2009).
72.  In all cases where life imprisonment is provided for, the law says that an offender is ‘liable’
to be sentenced to such a sentence.  See generally, Penal Code Act, Cap 120, Laws of Uganda.
73.  For example, in Sayson Muganga v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.33/2005)[2008] UGCA
18 (22 September 2008) the appellant was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment by the Chief Magistrate. While dismissing his appeal against the conviction and the sentence,
the High Court held that ‘I am persuaded by neither the circumstances of this case nor the arguments of
counsel to disturb the sentence.  The act was ghastly and revolving and no remorse whatsoever was shown
by the appellant.’  In Guloba Muzamiru v. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 289/2003 (judgment of 22
January 2007, unreported), the Court of Appeal in dismissing the appellant’s appeal against his life
imprisonment sentence for defiling a 2 ½ year old girl, held that ‘[t]he appellant acted savagely.’
Court’s ruling, the Prison authorities said they were in the process of seeking the
Attorney-General’s advice on whether or not the judgment applied retrospectively.69
The Attorney-General’s advice would guide them on when the relevant prisoners would
be eligible for release.  Practice has also shown that some former death-row prisoners
have indeed been released following the Supreme Court’s ruling.70  Now that the death
penalty is no longer a mandatory sentence, it is likely that the number of offenders
sentenced to life imprisonment is likely to increase.  The discussion of the objectives
of punishment that courts have emphasized in sentencing offenders to life
imprisonment is merited.
VI.  SENTENCING OFFENDERS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT: THE
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT THAT UGANDAN COURTS HAVE
EMPHASIZED
In Uganda, unlike in South Africa and Mauritius where life imprisonment is a
minimum sentence in some respects,71 courts have a wide discretion in deciding
whether or not to impose a life sentence.  There are no instances where life
imprisonment is a mandatory or minimum sentence in Uganda.72  This means that
courts weigh various factors before sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.  These
factors have included the heinous manner in which the offence was committed and the
remorseless conduct of the offender;73 the effect the crime, such as defilement, had on
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74.  Uganda v. Matumbwe William, Criminal Session No. 24 of 2000 (High Court of Mbale,
judgment of 26 September 2002, unreported) the accused, a 40-year old man was convicted of defiling a
five  year old girl, and in sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, the Court held that offender made
the victim’s ‘life traumatized till she dies;’ Uganda v. Guloba Muzamiru, supra note 73, at 7, where the
accused, aged 22, was convicted of defiling a 2 ½ year old girl, the Court held that ‘[t]here is no excuse
whatever for him to do such a thing to this innocent child.  The child was penetrated bleeding….’
75.  Uganda v. Kasozi Lawrence, Case No. HCT-00-CR-0001 of 2002 (judgment of the High
Court of Kampala, 13 December 2003).
76.  Uganda v. Togolo Musa, HCT-04-CV-SC-0207/2002 (Judgment of the High Court of Mbale
of 13 August 2003) the accused, aged 25, was convicted of defiling a 7 year old girl.
77.  Uganda v. Baguma Moses, High Court Criminal Session Case. No.72/2001 (High Court of
Fort Portal, Judgment of 10 December 2002 [unreported]), where the accused was sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment for rape which was to run consecutively to the sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment he was
serving for rape.
78.  For example, in Kikonyogo Swaibu v. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 27 of 2002, (Judgment
of 26 September 2005, [unreported]).  The appellant was convicted of defiling his one year old daughter
and sentenced to life imprisonment.  The Court of Appeal in dismissing his appeal against the sentence
held that ‘the sentence of life imprisonment passed on the appellant was not illegal….  The offence
committed by the appellant on his own baby daughter was a heinous one and warrants a deterrent
sentence.’ In Uganda v. Guloba Muzamiru, supra note 73, at 7, where the accused, aged 22, was convicted
of defiling a 2 ½ year old girl, the Court in sentencing him to life imprisonment held ‘[t]he child was
penetrated [and] started bleeding, so I shall pass a deterrent sentence since this offence is so rampant and
also the circumstances in which he did it were deadly.’  In Uganda v. Togololo Musa, supra note 76, at
7, the accused was convicted of defilement and in sentencing him to life imprisonment, the Court held that
‘[t]he … convict is a first offender, this offence is rampant and when the circumstances are considered in
which it was committed, it was so brutally done under threat that he would kill the victim if she raised an
alarm…I shall therefore pass a deterring sentence and taking into account the period he has been on remand
he is sentenced to life imprisonment (20) years.  So that the other potential defilers can learn.’ In Uganda
v. Matumbwe William, supra note 74, at 14, the accused, a 40-year old man was convicted of defiling a 5
year old girl, and in sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, the judge held that ‘I shall pass a
deterrent sentence since he is a first offender… He is sentenced to life imprisonment.’
79.  In Uganda v. Wofeda Stephen, HCT-04-CV-SC-0293/2002 (Judgment of the High Court
of Mbale of 7 August 2003), the accused was convicted of defilement and in sentencing him to life
imprisonment, the Court held that it had ‘a duty to protect the Society against such animalism as
demonstrated by the convict.’  In Uganda v. Kasozi Lawrence, supra note 75, at 14, in sentencing the
convict to life imprisonment for robbery, the Court held that ‘[t]he manner in which the offence was
committed and the way he behaved when he was being arrested show clearly that this is a man that is
dangerous to society.  Court should protect society from the likes of the accused.  He is sentenced to life
imprisonment.’ 
the victim;74 the manner in which the offence was committed, the behaviour of the
accused during arrest and the fact that the accused is a danger to society;75 that the
offence is rampant;76 and the fact that the offender was a recidivist and appeared ‘to be
taking pride in his crimes.’77  With regard to theories of punishment, courts have
emphasized deterrence,78 protection of the society or community,79 and a combination
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80.  In Uganda v. Bahingana William, CHT-01-CR-SC-0071-2001 (Judgment of the High Court
of Fort Portal of 22 May 2002 [unreported]) the accused, a 55 year old man, was convicted of defiling a
2 ½ year old baby girl.  In sentencing him to life imprisonment, the Court held that the ‘court had to be
merciless if society is to learn that’ the severe penalty provided for under the law for defilement ‘is not a
formality but that it is meant to be a deterrent to would be defilers.’
81.  Uganda v. Kikonyogo Swaibu, supra note 78, at 5.
82.  In Kalibobo Jackson v. Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 45 of 2001 (judgment of 5 December
2001), the High Court convicted the appellant of rape and sentenced him to 17 years’ imprisonment.  In
justifying the imposition of a lengthy sentence, the Court held that ‘I shall pass a deterrent sentence taking
of deterrence and protection of society.80  In Uganda v. Kikonyogo Swaibu, the offender
was sentenced to life imprisonment for defiling his one-year old baby and the High
Court used a very strong language to justify the imposition of a life sentence:
The accused is a first offender.  However, he is a first offender who
has started his journey to crime in high gear.  His act of seeking sexual
gratification from a baby shows a dangerous level of sexual perversion
which, unless the convict is put out of circulation for a long time,
could manifest itself on yet another victim either in accused’s home
village or anywhere else in this country...The upcoming generation
must be protected from people of the accused’s insatiable sexual
appetite especially for toddlers.  Therefore, even if [the] convict is a
first offender, the ends of justice require that he gets a harsh
punishment.  He is a brute who deserves incarceration throughout his
life.  For the reasons above, I sentence him to life imprisonment.81
The above quotation shows that the Court was of the view that the only sentence that
could keep the accused ‘out of circulation’ for a very long period of time was life
imprisonment.  The Court was clear that the reason why the accused was being
sentenced to life imprisonment was the need for the society as a whole and for future
generations to be protected from people such as the likes of the accused.  The Court did
not hold that the sentence was meant to reform the offender so that by the time he gets
out of prison, society would be safer as a result of his rehabilitation.  It could be argued
that in cases where courts have emphasized deterrence and protection of the society in
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment, they are not concerned whether the offender
will be rehabilitated while in prison or not.  That is why the judge never mentions that
the sentence would enable the appellant to be rehabilitated while in prison.  In the case
where court was of the view that a lengthy prison term would serve a rehabilitative
role, it mentioned so expressly.82  In some situations, the court although imposes a
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into account the 2 years he has stayed on remand.  Since the maximum sentence for this offence is death,
the accused being a young man can reform.  He is therefore sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment.’ 4.
However, on appeal the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to seven years’ imprisonment.
83.  For example in Uganda v. Tigo Stephen, HCT-04-CV-SC-0176/2002 (judgment of 12
August 2003 [unreported]) the accused was convicted of defiling an eight year old girl and in sentencing
him, the High Court held that ‘I take into account the fact that he has been on remand for 2 years, so taking
that in account he is sentenced to life imprisonment (20 years).  So that the rest who intend to do the same
can stand warned.’ 8.
84.  The author reviewed 23 cases on life imprisonment.  The challenge was that most of the
cases are not reported and the 23 cases where collected from different court registries in Uganda.
85.  It would be a generalization to argue that courts in Uganda never refer to retribution in
sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.  It was not possible for the author to study all the cases in which
offenders were sentenced to life imprisonment.  This is because most of them are not reported.  As regards
those used in the study, the author had to visit different courts in Uganda and perused through volumes of
files to identify them.  Probably a study of all cases where life imprisonment was imposed could reveal that
courts have in some instances emphasized retribution.
86.  For example in Uganda v. Tigo Stephen, supra note 83, at 7–8, the accused was convicted
of defiling an 8 year old and the prosecution submitted that ‘[t]he small girl has to be traumatized
throughout her life.  I therefore pray for a still deterring sentence.’  In Uganda v. Kasozi Lawrence, supra
note 75, at 13, the prosecution submitted that ‘[r]obbery is a rampant offence which has caused severe
sufferings to victims.  I pray that the accused is given a deterrent sentence.’  In Uganda v. Senyondo
Umaru, Criminal Session Case No. 0018/99 (Judgment of the High Court of Masaka of 5 April 2000) the
offender was convicted of defiling a 7 month old baby, and before he was sentenced to life imprisonment,
the prosecution prayed that ‘a deterrent sentence be imposed on the accused and the would be defilers to
respect other people.’  In Uganda v. Guloba Muzamiru, supra note 73, the prosecution submitted that
‘[t]he child he defiled was so young.  I therefore pray that a deterrent sentence be passed.’ 6; and in
Uganda v Togolo Musa, supra note 76, at 7, the prosecution prayed that ‘the Court passes a sentence
which is deterrent.’
87.  In Uganda v. Walubiri George, Criminal Session No. 37/2001 (judgment of the High Court
of Jinja of 22 November 2001), the offender was convicted of defilement and before he was sentenced to
life imprisonment, the prosecution asked court that ‘a severe sentence be meted out.’
88.  In Uganda v. Wofeda Stephen, supra note 79, at 6.
89.  Uganda v. Kikonyogo Swaibu, supra note 78, at 5.
sentence of life imprisonment with a deterrent objective in mind, it does not expressly
mention deterrence.83
Of all the cases reviewed,84 the author did not come across a case in which the
court referred to retribution in sentencing an offender to life imprisonment.85  This
could be attributed to the fact that of all the cases reviewed, there was no instance
where the prosecution directly asked court to impose a retributive sentence.  In most
cases, the prosecution asked court to impose a deterrent sentence.86  However, there
were cases where the prosecutor did not mention the objective the punishment imposed
should serve and just called upon the court to, for example, impose a ‘severe
sentence,’87 ‘an appropriate sentence’88 ‘a maximum sentence of death,’89 ‘stiff
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90.  Uganda v. Baguma Moses, supra note 77, at 7.
91.  Uganda v. Bahingana William, supra note 80, at 6.
92.  Uganda v. Baguma Moses supra note 77, at 8.
93.  In Uganda v. Togolo Musa, supra note 76, at 7, the defence prayed ‘for leniency’; in
Uganda v Guloba Muzamiru, supra note 73, at 7, the defence prayed ‘for leniency’; in Uganda v.
Bahingana William, supra note 80, at 7, the defence prayed to ‘Court to impose a lenient sentence
commensurate with the offence committed’; in Uganda v. Wofeda Stephen, supra note 79, at 7, the defence
asked the court to exercise ‘mercy’ in sentencing the offender. However, in Uganda v. Nuhuu Asuman
Kibuka, Criminal Session Case No.507/99 (Judgment of the High Court of Kampala of 5 May 2000) the
accused was convicted of kidnapping with the intent to murder.  At sentencing, the prosecution submitted
that ‘[t]he offender [sic] attracts a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  A maximum sentence should
be given.’  The defence argued that the accused had health problems and that he had spent some time on
remand and that the ‘period on remand should be taken into account so that the accused can be reformed
if released early,’ at 19 and 20.
94.  Uganda v. Twinomugisha Moses (HCT-05-CR-SC-124 of 2003)[2005] UGHC 50 (15
September 2005).
punishment’90 or the ‘maximum sentence.’91
One could argue that in such cases, the prosecution thought that the
punishment would achieve a retributive objective because the offender was not being
punished for purposes such as deterrence or rehabilitation but for breaking the law.
Those who argue that punishment should serve a retributive role are of the view that
punishment cannot be justified on grounds such as deterrence and rehabilitation.  In
one case where the offender was convicted of defilement, the prosecutor asked the
court to impose a ‘stiff punishment’ because ‘society need [sic] protection.’92  This
submission, one could argue, reflects both the retributive and deterrent objectives of
punishment.  
It is also vital to note that in most of the cases reviewed, although the
prosecution called upon the court to impose a deterrent sentence, the defence did not
directly submit that the court should not impose a deterrent sentence.  The defence
instead argued that the court should be lenient towards the offender and impose a light
sentence without explaining which objective of punishment that light punishment
would serve.93
In Uganda v. Twinomugisha Moses,94 the accused was convicted of
manslaughter which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.  The Court took
into consideration the fact that the convict was young at the time he committed the
offence (18 years old) and although the prosecution prayed for ‘a deterrent sentence,’
the Court sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment and held that it could not sentence the
offender to life imprisonment because ‘[i]t is not in the interest of justice to convict
such a young man to long custodial sentence.  It will nor [sic] reform him.  The convict
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97.  For example in Uganda v. Tigo Stephen, supra note 83, at 8, where the accused was
convicted of defiling an 8 year old girl, the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.  Although the
prosecution prayed for the imposition of ‘a stiff deterring sentence’ the defence submitted that ‘[t]he
convict is remorseful and sorry.  He has a family.  He prays for leniency.  He has been on remand for 2
years.  I pray that, that is taken into account.’
98.  See, e.g., Uganda v. Senyondo Umaru, supra note 86, at 17–18, where the accused was
convicted of defiling and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without stipulating the objective
the sentence it imposed was to a achieve although it emphasized the seriousness of the offence; and Sayson
Muganga v. Uganda, supra note 73, at 6.
should be given a chance to reform and live [as] a useful citizen.’95  This could be
interpreted to mean that the Court was of the view that lengthy prison terms, such as
life imprisonment, are not good for rehabilitation and that if courts want offenders to
reform, they should sentence them to short prison terms.
Whereas courts are justified in expressing their views with regard to the
objective the sentence they have imposed should achieve, courts need to be careful not
to phrase their judgments in a language that casts doubt on the ability of the prison
authorities to rehabilitate offenders.96  By holding that, if an offender is to reform he
should not be sentenced to a long custodial sentence, the court is by implication
suggesting that prison authorities have failed in their duty of rehabilitating offenders
and that the court should try all it can to ensure that offenders capable of rehabilitation
are sentenced to short prison terms.  It is argued that the reasoning that courts should
not sentence offenders to lengthy custodial terms if they want such offenders to reform
could violate the doctrine of separation of powers.  The judiciary should not interfere
in the work of the executive (the prison authorities) unless the latter’s actions or
omission violates the Constitution.
There were cases where the defence counsel did not even mention the theory
of punishment the court should rely on in sentencing the offender although the
prosecution called upon the court to impose a deterrent sentence.97  However, in the
cases reviewed, courts did not give reasons why they preferred deterrence over
rehabilitation.
Another important factor is that there are cases where offenders have been
sentenced to life imprisonment without the court mentioning which objective the
punishment imposed is meant to achieve.  What the court does is to emphasize the
seriousness of the offence and the aggravating factors and then impose a life sentence.98
In all the cases reviewed, courts did not engage in a detailed discussion of the theories
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99.  Uganda v. Mutumbwe William, supra note 74, at 14.  The offender was convicted of defiling
a 5-year old girl.
100.  Uganda v. Walubiri George, supra note 87, at 21-22.
101.  In Nuuhu Asuman Kibuuka v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.3 of 2004) (Judgment of 4
November 2005) the appellant was convicted of kidnapping with intent to murder and sentenced to 20
years imprisonment.  In dismissing his appeal against both the sentence and the conviction, the Supreme
Court held that ‘[t]he sentence of 20 years imprisonment is not unlawful.  The ground [of appeal] must
therefore fail.’  See also, Nuuhu Asuman Kibuuka v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 54 of
2002)[2004]UGCA 17 (20 July 2004) the decision which the appellant appealed against to the Supreme
Court.  In Zungu Denis v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 287 of 2003)[2007]UGCA 61 (23 March 2007),
of punishment.  Most of the offenders serving life imprisonment in Uganda were
convicted of offences that attract the death sentence as the maximum sentence.  In some
of the cases, the prosecutors asked the court to impose ‘the maximum sentence’ a ‘stiff
sentence’ or an ‘appropriate sentence’ without specifically asking the court to impose
a life sentence.  What this has meant is that courts have looked at life imprisonment as
a lenient sentence resorting to statements such as the following:
The convict is a first offender who has been in detention for 2 years
and 10 months.  This offence is a serious one which attracts a
maximum sentence of death ... I shall pass a deterrent sentence since
he is a first offender having taken into account the period he has been
on remand.  He is sentenced to life imprisonment.99
Or
I consider the convict a first offender.  I also consider his age and
health as pleaded to court by his counsel...Doing the best I can, the
only leniency which this court can extend to him is to reduce the
punishment from death to life imprisonment.  I accordingly condemn
and sentence the convict to life imprisonment... I have had to pass this
harsh sentence in the hope that it will act as a deterrent to the accused
who certainly deserves to be out of circulation for a long time and
those with similar criminal inclinations.100
There are cases where offenders have been sentenced to life imprisonment without the
court mentioning that the offender has been sentenced to life imprisonment.  All that
the courts mention in such cases is the number of years of imprisonment to which the
offender has been sentenced.101  For example, in Uganda v. Muwonge John,102 the
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2003).
103.  Id.  It is argued that probably the Court could have intended to impose 20 years’
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In Baguma Fred v Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.7 of 2004)[2005]UGSC 24 (4 November 2005) the
appellant was convicted of defilement and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.  In dismissing his appeal
against the sentence, the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he sentence of 20 years imprisonment is not unlawful.
The ground [of appeal] must therefore fail.’
104.  Interview with Uganda Prisons officials, Luzira Prison, 14 January 2008.
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accused was convicted of defiling a 5-year old girl.  The Court considered the fact that
he was a first offender and had a family to care for and held that it ‘will not pass the
maximum sentence of death.  
However, considering all the circumstances of this case, the Accused is
sentenced to nineteen (19) years imprisonment.  Sentence takes [in account] the fact
that the Accused has been on remand for one years [sic] otherwise he would have been
sentenced to 21 years imprisonment.’103  When the prison officials look at the number
of years to which the offender has been sentenced, they notify him that he was in fact
sentenced to a life sentence.104  In some cases, courts have mentioned that the offender
has been sentenced to life imprisonment and the judge goes to the extent of mentioning
what the sentence means in practice.  In Uganda v. Tigo Stephen, for example, the
offender was convicted of defiling an 8-year old girl and while sentencing him, the
court held that ‘I take in account the fact that he has been on remand for 2 years, so
taking that in account he is sentenced to life imprisonment (20 years).’105
VII.  CONCLUSION
The above discussion has illustrated the tension between the death penalty and life
imprisonment in Uganda.  It shows that those in support of the abolition of the death
penalty have argued that it should be replaced with life imprisonment where the
offender will be imprisoned until his/her death.  Courts in South Africa and Namibia
have held that life imprisonment without the possibility of release is a cruel and
inhuman form of punishment.106  Should the death penalty be abolished in Uganda, it
is recommended that offenders sentenced to life imprisonment should have the
possibility of being released otherwise the sentence would violate Article 24 of the
Constitution which prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.
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107.  See, J.D. Mujuzi, International Human Rights Law and Foreign Case Law in Interpreting
Constitutional Rights: The Supreme Court of Uganda and the Death Penalty Question, 9 AFR. HUM. RTS
L. J. (2009).
108.  For example, in Akampulira Samuel v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No. 209 of
2003)[2006]UGCA 12 (3 February 2006), the appellant was convicted of defilement and sentenced to six
years’ imprisonment.  In dismissing the appeal against the sentence, the Court of Appeal held that ‘[t]he
appellant is supposed to learn something while in prison if he is capable of doing so.’
In the event that the government introduced life imprisonment without the possibility
of release, the Ugandan courts are called upon to refer to international law and foreign
case law, as they have done in other cases like in the death penalty decision,107 to
support their ruling that life imprisonment without possibility of release is cruel and
inhuman.
The discussion has also illustrated that in sentencing offenders to life
imprisonment, Ugandan courts have a wide discretion.  They consider factors such as
the personal circumstances of the accused, the manner in which the offence was
committed and the effects the offence had on the victim.  This wide discretion enables
courts to ensure that the punishment imposed fits both the offender and the offence.
Courts have put more emphasis on the deterrence and protection of society as the
objectives that the sentence of life imprisonment should serve.  This could be
interpreted to mean that if the judge is of the view that the sentence he/she is to impose
would serve a reformative or rehabilitative objective, he/she would sentence the
offender to a prison term shorter than life imprisonment.  This could be gathered, for
example, from the sentences imposed where offenders have been convicted of
defilement.
As the discussion above has shown, in most of the cases where offenders were
sentenced to life imprisonment for defilement, the court either emphasized deterrence
or protection of society or both.  However, in some cases where offenders have been
convicted of defilement and sentenced to prison terms of less than 10 years, courts have
emphasized rehabilitation.108  Ugandan courts have not emphasized retribution as an
objective of punishment in sentencing offenders to life imprisonment.  This, as has
been mentioned earlier, could be attributed to the fact that the prosecutors at sentencing
have often called upon courts to pass deterrent sentences.  In the light of the fact that
in some of the cases the accused were convicted of offences that attracted the death
penalty as the ultimate sentence, courts have tended to regard life imprisonment as a
lenient sentence.
